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Abstract
We estimate conditional duration models to analyse recovery processes
in emerging market economies. Our reduced form speci…cation is par-
simonious, as we focus on the e¤ect of growth in the US, EU, and
Japan on the prospects for economic recovery in emerging markets
experiencing recessions. In order to assess the robustness and fore-
casting capability of our results, we performed out-of-sample predic-
tions using recently available data pertaining to the economies hit by
the Asian crisis. The results of this exercise show that external fac-
tors beyond the control of the authorities can sucessfully explain the
bouncing back of most emerging markets economies hit by the Asian
crisis.
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The beginning of the Asian …nancial crisis in Thailand produced a chain of
events few had imagined. While at the onset it was possible to think that
the events of the summer of 1997 were just an adjustment after a period of
overheating, the unfolding of events showed that the gloomiest predictions
also proved to be the most accurate. The last months in Thailand were harsh,
and instability quickly spread to the region. Malaysia and Indonesia were hit
shortly after, and turbulence engulfed their more developed neighbours, such
as Hong-Kong and Korea. The e¤ects on the growth of the real economy
were quick to materialise: forecasts for growth in 1998 nose-dived in a region
which had accustomed itself and the rest of the world to fast growth. Not
long before, the World Bank’s annual development report had praised these
economies’ ability to enjoy long, and apparently well balanced, expansions.
It seemed that these economies could sustain fast growth inde…nitely, based
on the dynamism of their export sectors. The …nancial crisis took its toll in
1998: growth rates of the real sector were negative in most cases (and close
to zero in the remainder economies).
The Asian crisis presents some characteristics that seem to herald a new
age. First, it took place in the context of perceived increased globalization.
This phenomenon has a¤ected the real and …nancial sectors of the economy,
and has been identi…ed as one of the culprits for the scope and severity of
the last crisis. And it begun where it was least expected: among the “Asian
dragons” and “Asian tigers”. Second, the crisis quickly spread to another re-
gion, namely Latin America. Third, recovery was prompt: forecasts indicate
that most emerging market economies will have bounced back by the end
1999, and the remainder by 2000. This paper focuses on the latter point.
1The Asian crisis, and its contagion, have been analysed by a number of
prestigious economists. Prior to these papers, the debt and Mexican crises
had received the attention of academic economists. The next paragraph
presents a partial review of these papers.
A…rst group examines institutional failures in emergingmarket economies
that created situations propitious to speculative bubbles (Corsetti, Pesenti
and Roubini (1998a), Mishkin (1999), Krugman (1998)). A related prob-
lem pertains to the nature of world economic governance, and how policies
advocated by international organisations may have had an adverse e¤ect (Ro-
drik (1998), Kho and Stulz (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998)). In the same
line, International Monetary Fund (IMF) inspired adjustment plans have
been scrutinised (Edwards (1989)). Another group of papers has focused on
the macroeconomic evolution that preceded the onset of the crisis (Corsetti,
Pesenti, and Roubini (1998b), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998c), Burn-
side, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1998)). Contagion e¤ects have also received
substantial attention (Glick and Rose (1998), Forbes and Rigobon (1999),
Tornell (1999)). Last, Diwan and Hoekman (1999) have examined how trade
patterns in‡uenced the unfolding of the crisis in Asia. This paper is prob-
ably closest to ours, as it focuses on transmission mechanisms in the real
economy. Prior to these papers, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 had been thor-
oughly analysed (Edwards (1997), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a and
1996b)).
This corpus has greatly enhanced our understanding of the build up to a
crisis and its subsequent unfolding. There is nonetheless a related question
which remains largely unanswered. Indeed, recovery processes have received
little attention, save for speci…c case studies. Apart from an analysis of IMF
2inspired plans (see Corbo and Fisher (1995) for a survey), we do not know
of general analyses of emerging market recoveries.
While it is clear that an analysis of crises presents an intrinsic interest
for economists, we feel that recovery processes are also worth attention. The
bouncing back of most Asian (in 1999) and Latin American economies (fore-
casted for 2000) has indeed been astounding. What looked like the possible
onset of a global recession turned out to be a severe adjustment. Of course,
it could be the case that globalization has changed the behavioural rules
of emerging market economies: adjustments are more virulent, but so are
recoveries.
In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on this issue. We hope to
contribute to an understanding of exogenous factors a¤ecting emerging mar-
ket recoveries, while shying away from providing (ex-post) explanations for
the onset of crises. To this end, we analyse emerging market recessions since
the late 1950’s, and attempt to identify general recovery patterns (beyond
some tautological …ndings).
Given the exploratory nature of this venture, we limit ourselves to simple
and transparent exercises, that can be easily interpreted in light of economic
theory. Indeed, the theoretical underpinnings of our estimations are the pre-
dictions of a Mundell-Fleming model of small open economies under di¤er-
ent exchange rate and balance of payment regimes. Our objective is purely
descriptive: we try to unearth some general patterns of emerging market
recoveries (for the real economy) since the late 1950’s.
As for many things, the “proof of the pudding is in the eating”. Given
that our exercise is exploratory and descriptive, we assessed its predictive
power. Our sample ends in 1997, and does not include the Asian crisis.
3We therefore used our estimates to assess how the statistical model behaved
by making out-of-sample predictions. Our model successfully replicates the
observed time-path of recoveries.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes how
we have de…ned recessions for the emerging market economies of East Asia
and Latin America. We also explain how the variables were constructed, and
attempts to identify geographic and/or time …xed e¤ects. Section 3 motivates
the exercise and proposes a simple econometric model . Section 4 presents
the results and discusses them. Section 5 carries out of sample predictions,
while section 6 provides some concluding comments.
2 Motivation
Save for the existence of trading Martians in …nancial or real assets, the
world economy is a closed one. This implies that all economic transactions
are, in the ultimate instance, endogenous. For example, the …scal situation
in Brazil may worry foreign investors who may adopt strategies which may
have an e¤ect on the valuation of Wall Street stocks. This may in turn a¤ect
consumers’ perception of their own wealth (in the US and elsewhere), which
may feed through savings decisions, and may a¤ect the growth rate of the real
economy. Realised growth may bear some weight on the decisions of macro
policy makers (both in the US and elsewhere), which may a¤ect Brazil’s
potential for revenue collection. The repetitive tone of the last sentences
aims at emphasizing the speculative nature of the realisation of the chain of
events.
The above statement is correct, but needs to be quali…ed. First, there
are purely exogenous technology shocks. Second, some of the economic re-
4lations in the world economy are very weak, and can be safely assumed to
have second order e¤ects. For instance, while it is true that the rest-of the-
world’s health a¤ect US growth prospects in the short to medium term, the
same cannot be said of, say, the Ecuadorian economy. This statement ulti-
mately motivates our empirical exercise: in the short to medium term, the
growth rate in the US, Europe, and Japan may be reasonably considered as
exogenous for each emerging market economy taken individually. Indeed, it
is improbable that decisions by agents in each developing economy have a
direct consequence on the growth prospects of Japan, the US, and the EU.
By contrast, we believe that the realised growth performance in the large eco-
nomic blocks a¤ect the potential for emerging market recoveries. The latter
statement is self-evident; our contribution is try to measure its magnitude
and to determine whether it is constant through time and space.
The theoretical underpinnings of our estimations are simple. We think
of emerging market economies as small and open, and that they behave
according to an IS-LM framework. We do not require to make any speci…c
assumptions pertaining to the exchange rate (…xed, ‡exible, or crawling peg),
or balance of payments regime (full, limited, or prohibited, movements in
capital ‡ows). In all of the cases alluded to above, a recovery in the external
sector driven by (exogenous) foreign demand increases national income in the
short to medium term. Our analytical framework is keynesian to its core, and
focuses on “export led recoveries”.1 Appendix A.1 provides a brief reminder
of the “mechanics” of this class of models.
We assume that all emerging markets share the same knowledge on how
1As mentioned previously, positive technology shocks may also a¤ect the prospects of
recoveries. While not denying the importance of this e¤ect, we do not attempt to measure
its magnitude.
5to recover from a recession. and that they sistematically implement this
technology and eventually succeed in coming out of recession. However, there
are external factors that speed up or slow down the recovery process and are
beyond the control of the country. We attemp to identify the importance of
these exogenous factors. In particular, the aim is to assess the extent to which
growth in the large economies a¤ect recoveries. The idea is, again, simple:
we want to identify the e¤ect of growth in the US, EU, and Japan, on the
recovery prospects of emerging market economies. To this end, we estimate
a parsimonious reduced form. Indeed, endogeneity problems prevent the use
of variables that are known to a¤ect recoveries. For instance, country speci…c
risk premia, …nancial ‡ows, or trade policy variables are all endogenous to
an incipient recovery. Of course, these policy dependent variables, could,
in principle, be instrumentalised. In practice, the task is insuperable. The
diversity of recessions and policy variables we are dealing with imply that
valid and well performing instruments are simply not available. Thus the
choice of a simple, readily interpretable, reduced form.
3 Variable de…nition and data analysis
The …rst hurdle is to de…ne recessions and recoveries in emerging market
economies. The main sources are the Penn World Tables on real per capita
GDP growth till 1992, and IMF statistics thereafter. Our series run from the
late 1950’s till 1997. We have gathered data on twenty two emerging market
economies, both from Asia and Latin America, and Turkey. The selection of
countries was determined by data availability, that is we have not excluded
an economy for which data was available.2 We constructed the series on per
2The exception is Taiwan which is not included in our database, though series exist.
The reason is that, given our de…nition of recessions and Taiwan’s hitorical growth rates,
6capita GDP growth in the large economies (US, EU, and Japan) from the
same sources and Eurostat.3
The way we de…ne a recession, or crisis, is the following: an economy is
deemed to enter into a recessionary cycle if it ful…lls two conditions. The
latter are that per capita GDP is found to be below its trend level, and that
the growth rate is also found to be below its local trend growth rate.4 The two
conditions are thus that the economy’s output is below potential, and that
the economy grows below potential. We thus de…ne recoveries as the moment
in which the economy starts growing at a rate greater that its local trend
growth (i.e., the gap between actual and potential output is being closed). We
obtained the trend levels of GDP by applying the Hodrick-Prescott …lter to
the GDP series, using a smoothing factor of 1600. Table 1 lists the countries
that are included in our sample and the recessions we have identi…ed.
Insert Table 1 about here
These de…nitions are simple, transparent, and concur with generally ac-
cepted recessionary periods. Indeed, this taxonomy properly identi…es all
previously labelled global crises. Our approach has the twin advantage of
being “mechanical”, and thus avoids ad-hoc judgments as to what amounts
to recession, and also caters for structural variations in the growth poten-
tial of each emerging market economy.5 Last, our estimation of the trends
generate business cycles of 4 to 8 years, well in line with existing empirical
we would have had to classify Taiwan as experiencing a recession with growth rates of 4%
or more. This did not appear as reasonable.
3We de…ned “Europe” as the …fteen countries currently forming the EU. Including all
Western European economies did not result in any signi…cant di¤erences.
4Once we obtain trend levels of GDP, computation of the local potencial growth rate
is immediate.
5This is particularly relevant for countries such as China, which have experienced sharp
changes in their potencial growth rate during the time period under consideration.
7evidence.
The number of recessions we identi…ed since the late 1950’s is fairly similar
across countries, and ranges from 5 to 9 episodes. Global crises are clearly
identi…ed by our method. For instance, 19 of the 22 countries experienced
a recession during the …rst half of the 1970’s. Moreover, the debt crisis is
re‡ected in our sample; all Latin American countries are in recession during
1982-84, except for Ecuador, which was hit later. While global crises are
clearly identi…ed, it also emerges that emerging market recession are not
always general phenomena (e.g. the Philippines are in recession in 1993,
while the rest of the economies are growing fast). This diversity clearly
indicates that emerging market recessions can not be solely explained by the
evolution of the world economy.6
For the sample as a whole, the average duration is of 1.91 years and the
incidence ratio stands at 1.41.7 These summary statistics for each country
are given in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
Before turning to estimation, we checked wether time or region speci…c
…xed e¤ects were discernible in the data. To this end we have estimated
non-parametric survival functions for each of the four decades present in
6It is important to stress that the results we present below depend on our de…nition of
recessions and recoveries. We have tried alternative methodologies, none of which appeared
as superior. For instance we used the geometric mean of the growth rate over the entire
period and deviations thereof. The drawback is that some emerging market economies
experience important changes in their trend growth rates, which are not catered for when
using the geometric mean. We also imposed a stricter criterion for identifyning recoveries,
namely that observed growth ought to be superior to the local trend rate for at least two
years. Applying this methodology lengthens recessionary cycles, and reduces the number
of recession cum recovery episodes. We re-ran all our estimations using this alternative
method. The results for the variables of interests were qualitatively similar. Overall, we
feel that the de…nition we end-up using was the most reasonable.
7The incidence ratio is de…ned as the average occurence of recoveries in our sample.
8our sample. The survival functions presented below were obtained using
the estimators proposed by Kaplan-Meier (Kafbleisch and Prentice 1980).









where nk is the population alive at time k and dk the number of failures.
We estimated ( 1 ) for the entire sample as well as by decade. The results
are presented in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
As can be readily seen, the estimates by decades are less precise than for
the entire sample, as the number of observations is smaller. However, the
con…dence intervals overlap substantially. As a result, a Â2 test does not
reject the hypothesis of equality of the survival functions. In other words,
we cannot detect a time speci…c …xed e¤ect with regard to recession cum
recovery cycles.
We carried out the same exercise by regions, grouping Asian and Latin
American countries together. The results are presented in Table 4.
Insert table 4 about here
As before, the estimates by region are less precise than those for the
entire sample. More importantly, we are unable to unearth a region speci…c
e¤ect. Indeed, a standard Â2 test does not permit rejection of the hypothesis
of equality between the survival functions of Asia and Latin America. This
implies that, once we correct for di¤erences in terms of potential growth
rates, no signi…cant di¤erence seems to exist between the emerging market
9economies of Asia and Latin America in terms of recessions’ duration. All
in all, we were unable to identify …xed e¤ects, both with respect to decades
or geographic origin. This suggests that there may be some common pattern
in emerging market recoveries, irrespective of time or geographic origin. We
thus move on to identify the e¤ect of growth in the three large economies




It appears reasonable to assume that, in the short run, growth in the three
large economies is exogenous for each emerging market economy taken indi-
vidually. However, itmay be the case thatthese economies, grouped together,
do have an in‡uence on the behaviour of our three blocks over the short run.
We therefore carried-out exogeneity tests for growth and real interest rates
in the EU, US, and Japan with respect to growth of the Asian and Latin
American regions.8 The results are presented in Table 5. The second and
third columns report the test for weak exogeneity proposed by Engle (1984,
pp. 815-816).
Insert Table 5 about here
We cannot reject the hypothesis of weak exogeneity, save for Japanese
growth with respect to the Asian region.9 In the fourth and …fth columns, we
8Real interest rates in the EU, US, and Japan are de…ned in the next section.
9We carried out the same exogeneity tests with respect to each individual emerging
market. At the 5% con…dence level, we only rejected the null of weak exogeneity in 7
out of 132 cases. As for Japanese growth, weak exogeneity was only rejected in one out
22 cases at the same con…dence level: Singapore. Given the size of the two economies,
10present the results for Granger’s Lagrange multiplier causality test(Charemza
and Deadman 1997). The …rst step in this two stage procedure for identify-
ing strong exogeneity consists in testing for weak exogeneity. In the second
stage, we test the null hypothesis of absence of Granger causality.10 The
results are that exogeneity is only rejected in the case of Japan with respect
to Asia. Consequently, one avenue is to eliminate Japan from our reduced
form estimation, and only include growth in the EU and the US. However,
this would probably yield spurious results, as we would estimate the net ef-
fect of growth in the EU and US, plus the indirect e¤ect of Japan. Instead,
we chose to instrument Japanese growth using growth in the EU and US,
Japanese public spending, and dummies for election years.11 We then used
the estimated values as regressors.
4.2 Econometric speci…cation
We focus on duration models, and attempt to assess the e¤ect of growth
in the three large economies on the recovery prospects of Asian and Latin
American countries. We estimated four distinct speci…cations, both in dis-
crete (linear and probit) and in continuous time (Cox and Weibull). For the
dichotomous dependent variable models (in discrete time), the universe is
made-up of all the years in which emerging market economies are in reces-
sion or have just recovered. Our dependent variable takes value zero when
the economy enters in a recession and remains in that situation, and value
one the year the recovery cycle begins. Subsequent recovery/expansion years
we take this result as evidence that endogeneity only appears when Asian economies are
grouped together.
10This sequential procedure increases the likelihood of rejecting the hypothesis of strong
exogeneity. See Charemza and Deadman (1997, p. 234).
11In addition to these dummies, we introduced one for 1993, the …rst time since the
1950’s that Liberal Democratic Party lost power.
11are not included in our sample. In the continuous time speci…cations, our
dependent variable is an entire recession cum recovery cycle. As a result, we
have fewer observations, which reduces the precision with which we estimate
our coe¢cients. We condition the probability of recovery on the length of
time that the economy has been in recession.
The duration models we estimate are described in detail in appendix
A.2.???? In what follows, we limit ourselves to the main modelisation issues.
We de…ne the random variable T as the time that economy is in recession,
and call this variable the duration. Each emerging market economy enters
in recession at time T = 0. We assume that all the economies are homoge-
neous with respect to the factors that a¤ect the distribution of T. Last, the
probability that an economy in recession during t periods and described by
vector x will recover during the time interval dt is given by:
Pr(t · T < t + dt j T ¸ t;x) (X)
Thus, the hazard function conditional on x is given by:
h(t;x) =lim
dt!0
Pr(t · T < t + dtjT ¸ t;x)
dt
: (X)
It is possible to interpret h(t;x)dt as the probability of recovery during
the interval dt; given that the economy has been in recession for period t.
Therefore, h(t;x) must be restricted to non-negative values. We estimate two
hazard functions in continuous time. The …rst is the Cox hazard function




12One advantage of this speci…cation is that, given the assumption of pro-
portionality, it is not necessary to estimate h1(t) in order to estimate ¯.
Our second continuous time model is the Weibull speci…cation, where:
h1(t) = pt
p¡1 (X)
In the discrete time formulation, the hazard function takes the form:
h(t;x) = Pr(T = t j T ¸ t;x(t)) (X)
Note that this formulation can be viewed as a sequence of dichotomous
binary choices for the surviving population in each moment in time, subject
to restrictions across equations (Kiefer 1987).
Given the exploratory nature of our exercise, we have used these four
distinct estimation techniques in order to check the robustness of our results.
In discrete time, the two speci…cations are the linear and probit models
in which the dependent variable is dichotomous. For the linear model we
simply carried out GLS, whilst we estimated the probit model by maximum
likelihood. In continuous time, we have estimated the two duration models
presented above (Cox and Weibull) by maximum likelihood.
4.3 Variable de…nition
The independent variables are, …rst, the per capita growth rates of the EU,
Japan, and the US interacted with the exports from each emerging market
economy to each of these three blocks. We then multiplied this variable by
the degree of openness of each emerging market economy.
Openess is de…ned as the ratio of imports plus exports over total GDP.
In order to deal with possible problems of short term endogeneity, we took






where Xj and Mj respectively denote exports and imports, D = 1960’s,
1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s, and j = our 22 emerging market economies.
We have data on bilateral trade ‡ows from 1978 to 1997. The share
in exports of each block is very stable across time for all emerging market
economies. We thus used the 78-97 average for the entire sample. Apart from
solving the problem of data availability, this choice also alleviates possible
problems of short term endogeneity. Thus, exports ‡ows from emerging
market economies to each of the three large blocks are de…ned as:
Exportsj;i =
Xj;i
Xj;US + Xj;EU + Xj;Jap
where i = EU, US, and Jap.
Thus, the regressor measuring the e¤ect of growth in the three large
economies on emerging market recovery prospects is constructed as:
¢GDPi;t = ¢gdpi;t ¤ Exportsj;i;t ¤ Openj;D
where t denotes time and ¢gdpi;t is the per capita growth rate in the
three large blocks at time t. In the Tables, these regressors are respectively
denoted ¢GDPUS, ¢GDPEU, and ¢GDPJap.
We introduced the changes in the terms-of-trade of country j, assuming
that each individual economy acts as a price taker in world markets (that is,







14Both the denominator and the numerator are expressed in the same cur-
rency; this implies that we use an index of real relative prices. For some
emerging market economies, data is lacking on import and export prices. In
the latter cases, we used the regional index (Asia or Latin America).
Toaccount for exogenous monetary shocks, we constructed real short term
interest rates in Yens, Deutsche Marks, and US dollars. These three variables
were constructed by subtracting the GDP de‡ator to the (annualised) three
month interest rates.12 Both series were retrieved from the IMF statistics. In
the …nal speci…cation, we only included US rates, as the Japanese and Ger-
man rates did not prove signi…cant (while the US one always was). Apart
from possible issues of multicolinearity, this probably re‡ects the overwhelm-
ing proportion of borrowing in US dollars on the part of the economies in
our sample during the time period under consideration.13
We also included a time trend in order to capture the e¤ect of potential
long term changes, such as the increasing globalisation of the world economy.
We denote this regressor as TT. In addition, we speci…ed the inverse of the
duration of the recession. This variable, which is used only in the discrete






This variable re‡ects one of the few universal rules in economics for cycli-
cal variables: what goes down must go back up. As countries do not dis-
12We took the three month Treasury Bill for the US and the three-month interbank rates
for Germany. For Japan, we used the rates of bonds traded with three-month repurchase
agreements until 1989, and the rates of three-month certi…cate of deposit thereafter.
13We also introduced lagged values for real interest rates in an attempt to identify
inertia in the transmission of these monetary shocks. While current real rates were always
signi…cant, these lagged variables were not, and did not a¤ect the point estimates of the
other regressors. Consequently, they were droped from the …nal speci…cation, as they were
simply increasing noise.
15appear because of economic ‡uctuations, recoveries always end-up material-
ising. This variable re‡ects the fact that, all else equal, the probability of
bouncing back is higher the longer the country has been in recession.14 In
the Weibull speci…cation, the duration is parametrised in a polynomial form.
Our last independent variable are dummies to account for possible …xed
e¤ects that may a¤ect the speed of recovery. These …xed e¤ects may be of
diverse origin in our sample. For instance, they may be related to political
developments, the ability of emerging market policy makers, demographic
structure, our de…nition of recession cum recovery cycles, dependence on
a particular commodity (e.g. oil or copper), or the size of the country.15
The obvious solution is to introduce n ¡ 1 country dummies (with n = 22).
The drawback is that in our exercise, it is not clear what reference country
(the nth one, i.e. the constant) ought to be chosen. More importantly, the
structure of our database results in potential multicolinearity problems when
n ¡ 1 dummies are introduced, thus substantially decreasing the accuracy
of the estimates. Therefore, we attempted to group countries by objective
criteria such as size, geographic area, levels of development (e.g., “Tigers” vs.
“Dragons”), or membership to regional blocks (ASEAN, Mercosur). None of
these aggregation procedures proved satisfactory in the sense that dummies
did not seem to improve the accuracy of the estimates. This should come as
no surprise, as the …xed e¤ects we are trying to unearth are likely to be very
idiosyncratic. Instead, we ran our probit regression without a constant and
14The estimated coe¢cient for this variable is a¤ected by our de…nition of recessions
and recoveries. We thus re-estimated our models by applying alternative de…nitions (see
footnote X). The estimate for this variable turned out to be di¤erent, but the other
estimated parameters remained unchanged.
15In the case of Indonesia, Sukarno’s succession led to a long and protracted recession.
Compared to other Latin American countries, Ecuador enters recessionary cycles with a
lag. Korea appears to have a surprising ability to bounce back quickly. We are agnostic
regarding the cause of these country idiosyncratic e¤ects.
16with n country dummies. We then took the point estimates of these dummies
and grouped them according to standard clustering procedures. Applying a
square distance criteria, we obtained four clusters.16 Thus, this procedure for
generating our dummies groups the economies according to the speed with
which they bounce back. We called these three dummies very slow, slow and
fast, with the fourth cluster forming the reference group.17 The latter, which
contains economies recovering at “intermediate” speed, represents half the
countries in our sample.
It is perhaps useful to point out that none of the results that we present
below depend on the introduction of …xed e¤ects and the choice of clustering
procedure.18 Controlling for these e¤ects increases precision, but does not
alter the essence of the results. A speci…cation without …xed e¤ects yields the
same signs and orders of magnitude for the point estimates of the independent
variables of interest. The di¤erence lies in the standard errors, that are larger
when …xed e¤ects are ignored.
The descriptive statistics for our independent variables are presented in
Table X.
Insert Table X about here
16We experimented with alternative clustering procedures and number of groups. In
particular, we clustered the data into 2 to 6 groups. Simple iteration indicated that the 4
group clustering was the most appropriate (though the results were qualitatively similar
with, say, 3 or 5 clusters).
17The “very slow” group is made-up of Brazil and Bolivia and the “slow” one of Indone-
sia, Hong-Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines. The “fast” cluster consists of Mexico,
Korea, Argentina, Peru, and India. The remaining economies form the reference group.
18Estimation of alternative speci…cations (e.g., with a distinct number of clusters) are
available upon request.
175 Results
Having four distinct model speci…cations allows us to check for consistency
and robustness. As the variable measuring the changes in the terms of trade,
¢tot, only proved to be signi…cant in the discrete speci…cation, we re-ran the
continuous regressions without this variable. None of the results change.
The estimations, presented in Table X, indicate that growth in Europe
and the US positively a¤ect emerging market recoveries. Both these variables
are highly signi…cant in the two discrete speci…cations. The signi…cance of
these two variables is lower in the Cox and Weibull exercise, which, by con-
struction, contain fewer observations, thus reducing the precision of the point
estimates. However, applying one-tailed tests yields signi…cant estimates at
10% (or less) in the continuous time speci…cations. This last comment gen-
erally applies to the other variables as well.
Insert Table X about here
The positive signs for these two variables accords well with the theoretical
predictions of a Mundell-Fleming model. What is perhaps surprising is that
the e¤ect of Europe is larger than that of the US. Our prior was that the
e¤ect ought to be of roughly equal size, but this did not prove to be the
case. Moreover, this order of magnitudes systematically emerges from all the
estimations we ran. However, we cannot reject equality of the two coe¢cients
in a statistical sense.
The result for Japanese growth is surprising. The signi…cant negative sign
indicates that, in the short run, weak Japanese growth facilitates emerging
market recoveries. This …nding emerged from all the speci…cations we es-
timated. The most plausible explanation is that both Japan and emerging
18market economies generally rely on the export sector to bounce back from a
recession. A large share of these exports go to the US and Europe. In terms
of composition, there is an overlap between the exports of emerging market
economies and those of Japan. Thus, it would seem that, in the short term,
Japan and these economies are direct competitors on export markets. Diwan
and Hoekman (1999, p. 10) detect this phenomenon in their data (which only
pertains to Asia). Analysing the evolutions of Japan’s export performance
and that of emerging market economies in Asia, these authors conclude that:
“Japanese export growth tends to be negatively related.” and further: “More
important, the results corroborate the hypothesis of rising competition be-
tween Japan and the higher-end producers in the region, especially in the
recent years”. There are various (non-competing) explanations for this …nd-
ing. For instance, a strong yen weakens export industries in Japan, which in
turn gives more room for expansion in the external sector of emerging market
economies.19 Given that Asian emerging market economies have a produc-
tion structure closer to that of Japan compared to that of Latin American
countries, we would expect the (short term) e¤ect of Japanese growth to be
stronger with respect to the former. This is what we …nd in our data when we
split the sample by geographic area. Re-running our discrete speci…cations
for Asia and Latin America separately, we …nd that the e¤ect of Japanese
growth is negative and highly signi…cant in the case of Asia, but that it is
19Though Diwan and Hoekamn (1999) focus on the build-up to the Asian crisis (and not
recoveries), their focus on transmission mechanisms in the real economy is similar to ours.
These authors note that during the period 1995-97 “The recent depreciation of the yen
will have been good for users of Japanese-produced inputs, but will reduce the incentive
for outward FDI (foreign direct investment), reduce Japanese demand for imports and
increase the export competitiveness of Japanese …rms that produce similar goods to those
of East Asian …rms”. The conditions in 1999 have been exactly the opposite: a strong
Yen and weak Japanese growth. By way of consequence, the above quote applies in our
context.
19not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in the case of Latin America.20
A comment is nonetheless in order: this e¤ect is a short term one. Indeed,
our exogeneity tests indicated that in the medium-term Japanese growth
positively depends on Asian growth taken as a whole, and vice-versa. Thus,
the sign of the Japanese variable has to be interpreted for what it is: a short-
run, contemporaneous e¤ect, and certainly not as evidence that international
trade is a zero sum game.
The real dollar interest rate appears with the expected sign and is sig-
ni…cant at 5% in the discrete speci…cation. The positive sign for the time
trend indicates that structural change in the world economy enhances the
speed of recovery. This probably re‡ects the fact that increasing world eco-
nomic integration has fasten the pace of transmission mechanisms across the
economies of our sample. The last variable, changes in the terms of trade,
appears as signi…cant and with the expected sign. Our three dummies (and
the constant) are also signi…cant. It should be noted that excluding them
from the estimations reduces the precision of the point estimates, but does
not change any of the main results.
Since we cannot directly compare the point estimates reported in Table
7, we present the hazard rates corresponding to our results in Table 8. The
numbers indicate how the probability of recovery is a¤ected by one extra
point in the growth rate of our three economic blocks. For instance, if,
all else equal, the US economy grows 1% more, the probability of recovery
increases by 11% for the “standard” emerging market economy in the probit
20Splitting the sample reduces the number of observations, and consequently, the degree
of precision of our estimates (results available upon request). This is indeed the case for all
our regressors in both speci…cations, save for Japanese growth in the Asian regression. It
is also interesting to note that point estimate for real interest rates is higher and more pre-
cisely estimated for Latin America, re‡ecting the latter’s heavier reliance on international
capital markets.
20speci…cation. The hazard rates clearly indicate that all models yield similar
results pertaining to each of the three large blocks. This suggests that the
results are quite robust.
Last, the hazard rates shed additional light on the relative importance of
the US and the EU. While the point estimates pertaining to growth for the
EU are larger than those relative to the US, the hazard rates are not. This
re‡ects the fact that, throughout the entire time period, the US has been,
on average, a larger export outlet for the economies under study.
6 Predictive capacity
We are surprised by our results, particularly those pertaining to Japan, but
con…dent that the estimates are robust. Given the exploratory nature of this
exercise, we attempted to check the validity of our estimates by applying
a stringent test: out-of-sample predictions. Ultimately, this is what is re-
quested from a time dependent model: information from the past ought to
shed some light on current and future developments. As our results some-
what depart from conventional wisdom, we thought that this may provide
convincing corroborating evidence.
As mentioned above, we did not include the Asian crisis in our sample in
order to be able to undertake out-of-sample predictions. Recent publication
of data allowed us to carry out that task. For the three large blocks, we used
the IMF’s latest published statistics on realised growth for 1997 and 1998,
and the predictions for 1999 and 2000 (World Economic Outlook, September
1999). For emerging market economies, we used data on realised growth
from the World Bank and the International Development Agency. For 1999
and 2000, we collected central forecasts (the latter are simply the average
21between the highest and lowest growth forecasts for 1999 and 2000).21 These
central forecasts are well in line with developments in the …rst three quarters
of 1999.
We applied our de…nition of recessions and recoveries to this new data.
We were thus able to identify which economies entered in recession in 1998
and those that were forecasted to recover in 1999 and 2000.22 We then used
our estimated parameters to assess the proportion of recoveries the model
predicts for 1999 and 2000 (recall that our sample used for estimation does
not include the Asian crisis). The results are presented in Table 9. Of the
emerging market economies that entered recession in 1998, between 57% and
66% of them recover in 1999, and the remainder will do in 2000 (based on
observed and forecasted values).23 The 57%-66% per cent range is due to
the classi…cation of Hong-Kong. The British hand over to China may have
generated a one-o¤ e¤ect. Using estimated coe¢cients, our model predicts
that, for the average emerging market economy in recession, 59% (linear
speci…cation) or 63% (probit) would bounce back by 1999. For the same
economies and the year 2000, the respective proportions are 83% and 72%
(while the forecasted value is 100%).
Insert Table 9 about here
This is in sharp contrast to the predictions of an unconditional duration
model in discrete time that includes only a constant and the duration of
21These “central forecasts” were obtained from Oxford Analytica, a specialist provider
of country studies and data.
22Although the …nancial crisis began in the late summer of 1997, its e¤ect on real growth
was felt as of 1998.
23Applying our de…nition of recession and recovery, o¢cial data and forecasts indicate
that Indonesia, Paraguay, Hong-Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand will
have experienced a recession in 1998. The last four will have recovered by the end of 1999.
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela are in recession in 1999, and all are
forecasted to recover by 2000, save for Colombia.
22recessions.24 For instance, an unconditional probit would predict only 38%
recoveries in the …rst year after the beginning of the recession, and 57% in the
second. With this information, it is possible to construct a success index.
The latter re‡ects the improvement that our model provides relative to a
benchmark speci…cation that only includes a constant and the duration of
the recessions. The value for the success by the probit model stands at 89.3%
and 60.5% for recoveries in 1999 and 2000 respectively. By this standard,
our conditional models appear as having strong predictive powers.
7 Some speculative thoughts as concluding
remarks
We started thinking about emerging market recoveries a bit more than a year
ago. Our concern was quite simple: we thought that the arrival of the Euro
may coincide with a global recession. These fears proved to be unfounded,
and our empirical model sheds some light on this misguided perception. First,
US growth during 1999 has been ba-ing: the latest quarterly data indicated
that the economy was steaming ahead at a (quarterly) rate above 5%. A year
ago, few would have ventured into such optimistic predictions, particularly
in view of the savings position of the private sector (household as well as
corporate). Thus, the …rst factor that helps explain the quick emerging
market recoveries has been the -largely unexpected- performance of the US
economy. The second factor is the performance of Japan. A priori, we did
not expect the short term e¤ect of Japanese growth to be negative; we thus
thought that this economy’s performance was increasing the incipient risk
of a global recession. The unexpected e¤ect unearthed by our estimation is
24Stricto sensu, an unconditional speci…cation would not even include the duration (thus
strengthening our results).
23the second element that has contributed to the recovery. Last, a word is in
order with respect to the performance of the EU economy. During this last
crisis, its e¤ect has been neutral, as EU growth has been average by historic
standards.
While the Asian crisis seemed to herald a new breed of recessions because
of its virulence and contagious nature, our model shows that, with respect
to recoveries, the basic rules of the game have not changed. Though it seems
that the pace of transmission have quickened (as evidenced by the signi…cance
and sign of the time trend), emerging market recoveries following this last run
of crises have followed the same historical pattern. Indeed, the experience of
the last 35 years allows us to make accurate out-of-sample predictions. The
latter exercise is particularly demanding, as the unfolding of events has been
unique by historical standards: a regional crisis engul…ng the “Dragons” and
“Tigers”, that spreads to Latin America, coupled with strong US growth and
recession in Japan. This parameter constellation has not been observed since
World War II. Despite this, our estimations permit a precise identi…cation of
recoveries’ time path .
Eighteen months may seem like an eternity when dealing with …nancial
crises. It is thus interesting to recall what the predictions and the general
mood were a year and a half ago. Basing our ourselves on accepted sources
such as IMF reports, and press articles published in the Financial Times
(FT) by respected policy makers and columnists, we can safely state that
mood was de…nitely on the gloomy side.25 Protectionist pressures were also
25The IMF’s “World Economic and Global Policy Challenges” (28/9/1998) stated in
its introduction that “International economic and …nancial conditions have deteriorated
considerably in recent months as recessions have deepened in many Asian emerging market
economies and Japan, and as Russia’s …nancial crisis has raised the specter of default”
(the latter did occur) and further “Chances of any signi…cant improvement in 1999 have
also diminished and the risks of a deeper, wider, and more prolonged downturn have
24on the rise.26 In this context, it seems valid to query whether the EU could
potentially have acted as an importer of last resort, should the US economy
have shown signs of fatigue.
escalated”. See also “Can we bounce back?”, Paul Volcker, FT, 7/10/1998, “A brief
crisis guide”, Samuel brittan, FT, 15/10/1998, or “Complacency trap”, Martin Wolf, FT,
18/11/1998.
26See for instance “Al Gore’s foreign policy”, Gerard Baker, FT, 19/11/1998, “Melting
point”, Guy de Jonquières, FT, 23/10/1998, or “US asks EU to curb import curbs”, Guy
de Jonquières, FT, 19/10/1998.
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28Appendix
A.1
The theoretical motivations of our estimations are those of a simple
Mundell-Fleming model applied to an emerging market economy. Extending
the …xed price IS-LM model, the simplest Mundell-Fleming model assumes
…xed prices levels at home and abroad. The LM relationship (liquidity pref-






; i1 < 0; i2 > 0
where i is the nominal interest rate, M
P is real money, and y is the economy’s
…nal output. Since prices are …xed, the in‡ation rate is taken to be equal to
zero at home and abroad in what follows. Thus, real and nominal interest
rates are equal. Nonetheless, the same conclusions can be drawn assuming
that in‡ation rates at home and abroad are the same at equilibrium. In that
case, only real interest rates will be relevent in the goods markets. If the
exchange rate is contant, under UIP the nominal exchange rate at home, i,







and, therefore, money supply must accomodate growth. For emerging mar-
kets economies, this has been the basic monetary policy framework since they
have experienced both high growth rates and a secular decline in money ve-
locity in the last decades.
The IS curve (investment equals saving) must account for the e¤ect of
the export and import price levels, PX
PM, on exports and imports:
x = x + ¯
PX
PM ;¯ < 0
29m = m(y) + ®
PX






























In the last four decades, emerging market economies have lived under
both …xed and ‡exible exchange rate regimes as well as some interesting in-






be interpreted as the equilibrium loci. On the other hand, an expansion in
exports under …xed exchange rates is automatically accomodated by an ex-
pansion in money due to the exchange rate policy, and no further assumptions
on monetary and …scal policy are required.
30A.2
Our population is made up of emerging market economies that are in
recession or are in their …rst recovery year. Let yt be real per capita GDP of









where the LT superscript stands for local trend and ¢stands for growth




given that the economy was at recession at t ¡ 1. We can thus de…ne a
variable “recovery” as
rt = 1 if the economy is in a recovery at time t.
rt = 0 if the economy is in a recession at time t.
We further assume that the economy’s gap with respect to its potential
growth depends on a number of exogenous variables, x1t, the evolution of













t ) + u1t
31At the same time, the Japanese economy depends on the evolution of the




t = f2(x2t;¢yt) + u2t
We do not need to assume that corr(u1t;u2t) = 0.
Conditions for identi…cation of the two structural equations are the usual
ones. We directly model the probability of recovery at any time conditional







t ;rt¡1 = 0);
as a linear, probit, Cox, or Weibull model. A two-stage procedure is re-
quired to avoid simultaneity bias in the estimations due to endogeneity of
Japanese growth. The standard errors computed directly in the two-stage
procedure are downward biased but unbiased estimates can be obtained with
the bootstrap.
In order to compute the contribution of any of the large economies to the
















































t ;rt¡1 = 0)
where the bar superscript stands for the average operator.
32Table 1: Emerging market economies and recession years
Country Years in which the economy is in recession
Argentina 1959, 1962:1963, 1966:1967, 1982, 1985, 1988:1990, 1995
Bolivia 1958:1961, 1964, 1969, 1972, 1984:1990
Brasil 1959:1969, 1983, 1990:1992
Chile 1958:1959, 1975:1976, 1982:1983, 1990:1991
Colombia 1958:1959, 1962:1963, 1965, 1967, 1975, 1977, 1983:1985, 1989:1991
China 1968:1969, 1976, 1981:1982, 1986:1987, 1989:1991
Costa Rica 1959:1962, 1964, 1967, 1969, 1982:1983, 1985, 1988, 1991
Ecuador 1958:1963, 1965, 1968, 1970, 1986:1987, 1989:1990, 1992
Philippines 1960:1961, 1963:1966, 1970, 1984:1986, 1991:1993
India 1966, 1972:1974, 1976, 1979, 1984, 1987, 1991
Indonesia 1967:1972, 1976, 1985:1988, 1991:1992
Korea 1964:1965, 1967, 1972, 1975, 1980:1982, 1985
Hong Kong 1968, 1970:1972, 1974:1975, 1982:1983, 1985
Malaysia 1966:1969, 1971, 1975, 1985:1987, 1992
Paraguay 1960, 1963:1966, 1968:1970, 1972, 1975, 1983, 1985:1986, 1988:1989, 1993
Mexico 1958:1959, 1961:1962, 1965, 1969, 1971, 1976:1977, 1983, 1986:1987
Peru 1956:1959, 1968, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1989:1990, 1992
Singapore 1966:1968, 1970:1971, 1974, 1976:1978, 1982:1983, 1985:1986, 1992
Thailand 1972, 1974:1975, 1980:1982, 1984:1986
Turkey 1960:1962, 1964:1965, 1967, 1969:1970, 1973, 1980:1983, 1985, 1988:1989, 1991, 1994
Uruguay 1959, 1963, 1965, 1967:1968, 1972, 1974, 1983:1985, 1988:1990, 1995
Venezuela 1960:1961, 1966, 1972:1973, 1982:1985, 1989, 1994, 1996
33Table 2: Recessions’ duration by country
Country Number Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Incidence ratea
Total 141 1.91 1.41 1 11 0.52
Argentina 7 1.57 0.79 1 3 0.64
Bolivia 5 3.20 3.03 1 7 0.32
Brasil 3 5.00 5.29 1 11 0.20
Chile 4 2.00 0.00 2 2 0.50
Colombia 8 1.75 0.89 1 3 0.57
China 5 1.80 0.84 1 3 0.56
CostaRica 8 1.50 1.07 1 4 0.67
Ecuador 7 2.00 1.83 1 6 0.50
Phillipines 5 2.60 1.14 1 4 0.38
India 7 1.29 0.76 1 3 0.78
Indonesia 4 3.25 2.22 1 6 0.31
Korea 6 1.50 0.84 1 3 0.67
HongKong 5 1.80 0.84 1 3 0.56
Malaysia 5 2.00 1.41 1 4 0.50
Paraguay 9 1.78 1.09 1 4 0.56
Mexico 9 1.44 0.53 1 2 0.69
Peru 7 1.57 1.13 1 4 0.64
Singapore 7 2.00 0.82 1 3 0.50
Thailand 4 2.25 0.96 1 3 0.44
Turkey 10 1.80 1.03 1 4 0.56
Uruguay 9 1.56 0.88 1 3 0.64
Venezuela 7 1.71 1.11 1 4 0.58
aThe incidence rate is de…ned as the ratio of the number of recoveries
over the total number of periods.
34Table 3: Survival functions by decades
Time Cases Exits S(t)a Std. Dev. Conf. Int. (95%)
Entire sample
1 141 0 1.00 . . .
2 141 74 0.48 0.04 0.39 0.55
3 67 35 0.23 0.04 0.16 0.30
4 32 19 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.15
5 13 8 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08
7 5 3 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05
8 2 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
12 1 1 0.00 . . .
1960 decade
1 40 0 1.00 . . .
2 40 20 0.50 0.08 0.34 0.64
3 20 12 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.33
4 8 2 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.28
5 6 4 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.15
7 2 2 0.00 . . .
1970 decade
1 39 0 1.00 . . .
2 39 25 0.36 0.08 0.21 0.51
3 14 7 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.31
4 7 4 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.19
5 3 1 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.15
7 2 1 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.12
12 1 1 0.00 . . .
1980 decade
1 34 0 1.00 . . .
2 34 14 0.59 0.08 0.41 0.73
3 20 10 0.29 0.08 0.15 0.45
4 10 7 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.21
5 3 3 0.00 . . .
1990 decade
1 28 0 1.00 . . .
2 28 15 0.46 0.09 0.28 0.63
3 13 6 0.25 0.08 0.11 0.42
4 7 6 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.15
8 1 1 0.00 . . .
Â2b : 3.17 ( Pr>Â2 :0.3656 )
aKaplan-Meier estimators of the survival function
bÂ2 test of equality of the survival functions
35Table 4: Survival functions by geographical area
Time Cases Exits S(t)a Std. Dev. Conf. Int. (95%)
Entire sample
1 141 0 1.00 . . .
2 141 74 0.48 0.04 0.39 0.55
3 67 35 0.23 0.04 0.16 0.30
4 32 19 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.15
5 13 8 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08
7 5 3 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05
8 2 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
12 1 1 0.00 . . .
Latin American countries
1 83 0 1.00 . . .
2 83 47 0.43 0.05 0.33 0.54
3 36 21 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.27
4 15 7 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.17
5 8 4 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.11
7 4 2 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08
8 2 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06
12 1 1 0.00 . . .
Asian countries
1 58 0 1.00 . . .
2 58 27 0.53 0.07 0.40 0.65
3 31 14 0.29 0.06 0.18 0.41
4 17 12 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.18
5 5 4 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08
7 1 1 0.00 . . .
Â2b : 1.62 ( Pr>Â2 :0.2032 )
aKaplan-Meier estimators of the survival function
bÂ2 test of equality of the survival functions
36Table 5: Exogeneity tests
Weak exogeneitya Strong exogeneityb
t Prob>jtj Â2 Prob>jÂ2j
Exogeneity with respect to Latin America’s growth
¢gdpUS 0.65 0.53 4.22 0.96
¢gdpEU 1.04 0.31 2.66 0.99
¢gdpJap -0.07 0.94 1.22 0.99
rUS -0.68 0.50 5.20 0.39
rEU 0.30 0.77 3.60 0.61
rJap -0.46 0.65 0.04 0.99
Exogeneity with respect to Asia’s growth
¢gdpUS -0.91 0.37 5.23 0.92
¢gdpEU 1.32 0.20 2.00 0.99
¢gdpJap 2.03 0.05 . .
rUS -0.97 0.34 2.16 0.83
rEU -0.71 0.48 3.56 0.61
rJap -0.52 0.61 8.80 0.14
aEngle’s weak exogeneity test.
bGranger’s causality test.
37Table 6: Descriptive statistics
Variable # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Data for binary models
¢GDP a
US
a 401 58.16945 68.01018 -163.9578 412.0433
¢GDP a
EU
a 401 43.27494 42.38119 -49.19273 224.3142
¢GDPJAP
a 401 36.44117 51.47791 -40.25202 367.9143
rUS 401 1.956955 1.900105 -3.599999 5.7
¢tot 401 -.9983292 14.29063 -53.97 59.05
DUR¡1 401 .6053607 .3059243 .0833333 1
Data for duration models
¢GDPUS
a 139 70.17705 71.46091 -67.65855 412.0433
¢GDPEU
a 139 46.67413 46.02283 -37.44179 224.3142
¢GDPJap
a 139 35.15473 47.0449 -17.62591 262.1264
rUS 139 1.788446 1.887021 -3.599999 5.7
¢tot 139 1.312734 15.36246 -53.67 57.68
a¢GDPi;t = ¢gdpi;t ¤ Exportsj;i;t ¤ Openj;D








38Table 7: Estimation results of the duration modelsa
Cox Weibull
Probit Linear ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
DUR¡1 -4.12 -0.85 . .
(.46 ) (.0557)
¢GDPUS 0.43x10¡2 0.08x10¡2 0.12x10¡2 0.13x10¡2 0.16x10¡2 0.16x10¡2
(.16x10¡2) (.034x10¡2) (.11x10¡2) (.97x10¡2) (.16x10¡2) (.14x10¡2)
¢GDPEU 0.59x10¡2 0.13x10¡2 0.27x10¡2 0.27x10¡2 0.48x10¡2 0.49x10¡2
(.24x10¡2) (.056x10¡2) (.18x10¡2) (.19x10¡2) (.31x10¡2) (.32x10¡2)
¢GDPJAP -0.32x10¡2 -0.07x10¡2 -0.27x10¡2 -0.28x10¡2 -0.38x10¡2 -0.41x10¡2
(.17x10¡2) (.042x10¡2) (.14x10¡2) (.14x10¡2) (.30x10¡2) (.24x10¡2)
rUS -0.2260 -0.0453 -0.0597 -0.0608 -0.0858 -0.0953
(.0626) (.0113) (.0419) (.0402) (.0799) (.0753)
¢tot 0.0099 0.0023 -0.0008 . -0.0046 .
(.0058) (.0013) (.0064) (.0118)
TT 0.0356 0.0076 0.0081 0.0083 0.0169 0.0193
(.0087) (.0021) (.0061) (.0069) (.0098) (.0114)
very slow -1.2573 -0.2819 -0.9730 -0.9728 -2.0057 -2.0043
(.4099) (.0841) (.5929) (.5614) (.9125) (.8873)
slow -0.6480 -0.1185 -0.2629 -0.2603 -0.4207 -0.4035
(.2735) (.0606) (.1993) (.1719) (.3101) (.3391)
fast 0.6963 0.1439 0.3754 0.3753 0.6528 0.6652
(.2280) (.0495) (.1526) (.1530) (.2976) (.2939)
constant -68.61 -14.19 . . -36.39 -41.24
(17.23) (4.13) (19.46) (22.63)
ln( p )b . . . . 0.9896 0.9801
(.0700) (.0762)
Obs. 401 401 139 139 139 139
Â2 148.56 32.31 27.33 27.49 34.10 34.66
R2c
37.39 38.68 . . . .
aBoostrap standard errors with 200 replications in parenthesis.
bln( p ) stands for the logarithm of the Weibull duration parameter.
cFor the probit estimates, the R2 is the (scaled) value of the likelihood function
whereby 1 corresponds to a perfect prediction and 0 to a model which only
includes a constant.
39Table 8: Hazard ratesab
Linear Probit Cox Weibull
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
United States 1.04 1.11 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
Europe 1.05 1.11 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.04
Japan 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
aHazard rates measure the variation in the probability of recovery when one of the large economies
increases its growth rate by 1%.
It is de…ned as:
h(t;x;z+1)
h(t;x;z) where h(t;x;z) = Pr(tjT > t;x;z). x are all the regressors except
¢gdpUS, ¢gdpEU, and ¢gdpJAP. z stands for any of these three variables
bSee Table 7 for the models’ speci…cations.
40Table 9: Out-of-sample predictions for the Asian crisis
Year of recovery 1999 2000
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d )
Start of recession:1998
Observed frequency1 0.57-0.66 . 1 .
Pred2: probit model 0.63 0.81 0.83 0.87
Pred: linear model 0.59 0.70 0.72 0.76
Pred: unconditional probit3 0.38 0.57 0.57 0.57
Start of recession:1999
Forecasted frequency4 . . 0.80 .
Pred: Probit model . 0.58 0.61 0.67
Pred: Linear model . 0.56 0.58 0.62
Pred: unconditional probit3 . 0.38 0.38 0.38
( a ): Observed and predicted recoveries in 1999.
( b ): Predicted recoveries in 2000 assuming 2% growth for the EU.
( c ): Forecasted and predicted recoveries in 2000 assuming 2.7% growth for the EU.
2.7% growth for the EU is the latest IMF forecast available.
( d ): Predicted recoveries in 2000 assuming 4% growth for the EU.
1The observed frequency indicates the percentage of countries that enter in recession
in 1998 and are forecasted to recover by 1999. Central forecasts are arithmetic means
of the forecasts provided by 13 distinct consultancies/institutes.
2Pred: prediction generated by our estimations.
3Unconditional model: predictions obtained with a probit model that includes only a
constant and the duration of the recession as regressors.
4The forecasted frequency indicates the percentage of countries that enter in recession
in 1999 and are forecasted to recover by 2000. Central forecasts are arithmetic means
of the forecasts provided by 13 distinct consultancies/institutes.
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